

#### Agenda

Goal: To review the range of alternative compliance options and understand when they make sense.

- Introductions
- Overview of Compliance Alternatives
- Understanding Economic Integration
- Exercise
- Setting the In Lieu Fee
- Discussion
- Closing

Please introduce yourself by yping your name and jurisdiction nto the chat

### Working Group Series



July 27th
Working with State Policies

August 24th

Communicating with the Public and Elected Officials

#### Joshua Abrams **COMMUNITY PLANNING COLLABORATIVE**

#### **RECENT CLIENTS**

- San Francisco
- San Jose
- San Mateo County
- State of California
- ABAG
- Salt Lake City


- Chan Zuckerberg Initiative
- San Francisco Foundation
- Irvine Foundation














Affordable Housing Policy | ADU | Facilitation | Sustainability





## Rick Jacobus Street Level Advisors



#### **Recent Clients:**

San Francisco

San Jose

Honolulu

Berkeley

Seattle

New York

Atlanta

Minneapolis

Los Angeles County

Lincoln Institute for Land Policy


**Grounded Solutions Network** 


PolicyLink

The Ford Foundation

F. B. Heron Foundation












Federal Homeownership
































#### **Alternative Compliance Options**



Source: Wang, R., and S. Balachandran. "Inclusionary housing in the United States: Prevalence, practices, and production in local jurisdictions as of 2019." *Lincoln Institute of Land Policy Working Paper. Lincoln Institute of Land Policy* (2019).

#### In Lieu Fees



#### In Lieu Fees

#### **Pros**


- Legal desirability of flexibility
- More units
  - Potential for leverage of outside funds
  - Use expertise of nonprofits
  - Can simplify financing of market rate units
- On site performance hard to monitor
- More flexibility in what units are built

#### **Cons**

- Prices often set too low
- Can slow down the process
- Can be difficult to get units in neighborhoods if land is not available or too expensive
- There may not be strong non-profits to give the money to
- Subsidies may already be spoken for

#### 2007 NPH Study

Half of CA inclusionary programs that collected in lieu fees had never spent them



Nonprofit Housing Association of Northern California, California Coalition for Rural Housing, San Diego Housing Federation and the Sacramento Housing Alliance. 2007. "Affordable by Choice: Trends in California Inclusionary Housing Programs." San Francisco, CA: Nonprofit Housing Association of Northern California.




- Seattle Incentive Zoning Program
- Most developers were given a choice between providing units on site or paying a fee
- In every case, developers with the choice paid the fee
- Should the program have required onsite units only?

Between 2000 and 2013 it took the Office of Housing an average of 47 months (3.9 years) to spend fee revenue.




**Balance of uncommitted funds** 




Overall between 2000 and 2012. Seattle invested \$230 million in 124 developments providing 6,338 units of affordable housing

# 10% of that City investment came from Bonus funds (in lieu fees)

#### Case Study: Seattle, WA







\$22,170,884 in Bonus Funds, led to the creation of 507 affordable units

This is three times the number of units that would have been provided onsite

# The fee funded projects served households earning 30-60% of AMI



#### Case Study: Seattle, WA



Where onsite units would have served households at 80% of AMI



#### **Land Dedication**






B. Land Dedication. In lieu of building inclusionary units, the developer may dedicate to the City land within the City that the City determines is suitable for the construction of inclusionary units and is of equivalent or greater value than is produced by applying the City's current in-lieu fee to the inclusionary obligation.



#### Clustering

Some cities allow clustering units into 100% affordable buildings.




#### Combined project qualifies for Density Bonus

#### 100% Affordable Project

- Financed with tax credits/bonds
- Most units below 40% of AMI

#### San Jose - Partnership for Clustered Units Option

- 15% affordable units may be clustered in same building or contiguous parcel
- Affordable project developed by city approved nonprofit sponsor
- Only if clustering is required for financing
- Developer minimum contribution = 75% of In Lieu Fee
- Affordable project built first or concurrent with market buildings







#### **Setting the Fee**

- 1. Arbitrary/ What the neighbors do
- 2. Point of indifference
- 3. Local subsidy needed to build to build an affordable unit
- 4. Total subsidy needed



#### Per Market Rate Unit or Per Affordable Unit

#### **Option A - Inclusionary**

• 10% or \$200,000 per unit

#### **Project**

- 10 units/10% inclusionary
  - 9 market rate
  - 1 affordable (required)

#### **Option B - Inclusionary**

• 10% or \$20,000 per unit

#### **Project**

- 10 units/10% inclusionary
  - 9 market rate
  - 1 affordable (required)


1 afford unit x \$200,000 = \$200,000 10 market units x \$20,000 = \$200,000

Math hint: Multiply by inclusionary percentage

## **Arbitrary Fee**




Low Fees High Fees




### **Definition:**

The fee level where the lost profit for the developer to build the unit is the same as the in lieu fee. Sometimes described as the cost to the develop.







# For Sale Example:




## **Example: Lost profit \$600,000**





## For Rent Example:



\$1000

sales price for

rental complex

\$200,000

Point of Indifference \$200,000 per affordable unit


#### **Local Subsidy Needed**




Growing level of subsidy per affordable housing unit

## **Local Subsidy Definition:**

The fee amount is based on the average amount of local subsidy that is needed historically to produce one additional affordable unit in a 100% affordable development...




**Example: Seattle 2016** 



Source: DRA Feasibility Study, Downtown Rental Prototype

### **Total Subsidy**



#### Growing level of subsidy per affordable housing unit


## **Total Subsidy Definition:**

The fee amount is based on the average amount of *total* subsidy that is needed historically to produce one additional affordable unit in a 100% affordable development...


### **Geographic Differences**



## **Geographic Differences**











- Try to agree on the methodology first, then get accurate data for getting the fee
- Agree on goal, do you want on site units or fees
- Fees allow leverage, which can be very powerful
- If fee is priced too high, no one will do it
- If fee is priced too low, you could get more units
- While pro formas are complicated, in lieu fees are easier





## **Exercise Instructions**

Part 1 – Large group, individually

Part 2 – Small groups

Wait for the word to enter the answer

### **Exercise Instructions**

- 1)What would the in-lieu fee be per affordable unit if you based it on the point of indifference?
- 2)What would the in-lieu fee be per market rate unit if you based it on the point of indifference?
- 3)If you wanted to encourage on-site production, what's the minimum amount you should set the in-lieu fee at?
- 4)What would the in-lieu fee be per affordable unit if you based it on the local subsidy needed to build a unit at the same AMI (70%)? How about per square foot?

